Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Summary analysis)
Preamble
Sets forth the authority for the protocol, citing Articles 2 and 3 of the FCCC (objectives and principles) and the Berlin Mandate (decision 1/CP.1).
Article 1:
Defines relevant terms: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Montreal Protocol; Annex I Parties as those listed in Annex I of the Convention, etc.
Article 2:
Requires Annex I Parties, "in order to promote sustainable development," to implement policies and measures such as:
Instructs Parties to "minimize" adverse impacts of climate change on "international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts" on developing countries. Calls on Parties to "cooperate," and requires Conference of the Parties (COP) to "consider ways and means to elaborate coordination of such policies and measures."
Article 3:
Annex I Parties shall, "individually or jointly" reduce carbon dioxide equivalent emissions listed in Annex A (list of six greenhouse gases) not to exceed amounts assigned in Annex B (list of specific targets for each Annex Party i.e. U.S. = 7%; EU = 8%; Japan = 6%) below 1990 levels "in the first commitment period 2008 to 2012.
By 2005, Annex I Parties "shall have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments."
Net changes in emissions resulting from direct human-induced land use changes in afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation "shall be used" to meet commitments of the protocol. Modalities, rules, and guidelines for measurements are to be adopted at the first session of the Parties after the protocol enters into force. The 12 Annex I Parties identified as "in transition to market economies" are to be granted "a certain degree of flexibility" in meeting commitments of the protocol.
Commitments for "subsequent periods shall be established in amendments to Annex B" (targets). Consideration of targets for subsequent periods shall be initiated "at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period" (2006). Excess emissions reductions during a commitment period may be "banked" for use during a subsequent period. Parties to the Protocol shall "consider what actions are necessary to minimize the adverse effects" of implementation upon developing countries, including "the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology."
Article 4:
Annex I Parties may "jointly fulfil their commitments," however, each Party is responsible for meeting its own target if the aggregate reductions fail to meet the combined reduction target. Parties may work jointly with "regional economic integration organizations."
Article 5:
One year prior to the start of the first commitment period, each Party shall have in place "a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions" using methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Methodologies for calculating "global warming potentials" shall be accepted by the IPCC and reviewed by the relevant subsidiary body of the COP.
Article 6:
Annex I Parties may "transfer or acquire...emission reduction units" providing that such emissions trading agreements results in reductions that are "additional to any that would otherwise occur. "Guidelines for the implementation of this Article, including verification and reporting," are to be further elaborated at the first session of the Parties after the protocol enters into force.
Article 7:
Annex I Parties shall modify their reporting procedures required by the FCCC, to reflect compliance with the commitments required by this protocol. The first session of the Parties after the protocol enters into force, "shall adopt guidelines for the preparation of the information required under this Article...and decide upon modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts."
Article 8:
Information submitted under Article 7 "shall be reviewed by expert review teams" created by the COP. Expert review teams "shall be coordinated by the secretariat" and shall be "selected from those nominated by the Parties...and appropriate intergovernmental organizations." Guidelines for review "shall be adopted" later. "Parties to this Protocol shall take decision on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol."
Article 9:
Requires a periodic review of the protocol "in the light of the best available scientific information." (Defined by COP II to be the report of the IPCC).
Article 10:
Reiterates no "new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I." Requires, "in order to achieve sustainable development," the formulation of "programmes...for periodic updating of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions." Such programs would:
Article 11:
Developed country Parties shall:
The Parties "shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds."
Article 12:
"A clean development mechanism is hereby defined."
The purpose of the clean development mechanism is to "assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development." Annex I Parties "may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their commitments" as determined by the COP.
The clean development mechanism "shall be subject to the authority" of the COP and shall be "supervised by an executive board of the clean development mechanism." (No provision is specified as to how the executive board is to be formulated). Emission reductions from such project activity "shall be certified by operational entities to be designated by the COP."
The clean development mechanism shall "assist in arranging funding of certified project activity," and provide "independent auditing and verification of project activities."
The COP "shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties...to meet the costs of adaptation." Participation in project activities "may involve private and/or public entities" subject to whatever "guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean development mechanism."
Article 13:
"The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol." The parties to the Protocol may or may not be the same as the Parties to the Convention. Therefore, decisions relating to the Protocol shall be taken only by Parties to the Protocol which is the same as the COP sitting as a Meeting of the Protocol (MOP), however, those Parties of the Convention that are not Parties to the Protocol participate as "observers" and may not participate in the decisions of the MOP. The subsidiary bodies of the Convention, serve mutatis mutandis to the MOP. Rules of procedure and amendment procedures for the MOP are the same as those for the COP.
Article 14:
The Secretariat of the Convention shall serve as the Secretariat of the Protocol.
Article 15:
The subsidiary bodies of the Convention and the Bureau (executive officers) of the Convention shall serve mutatis mutandis to the Protocol, with provisions for non-Parties to the Protocol to be replaced by Parties to the Protocol for "decisions taken under this Protocol."
Article 16:
Parties to the Protocol "shall modify the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the Convention." (Resolution of questions relating to implementation). Requires the COP to "define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines...for reporting and accountability for emissions trading."
Article 17:
The MOP shall, at its first meeting, "approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of the Protocol, including...an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol."
Article 18:
"The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol." (International Court of Justice, or an arbitration panel under the auspices of the COP).
Article 19:
The Protocol may be amended by consensus, if possible, or by "a three-fourths majority of the Parties present and voting." Amendments enter into force "for those Parties having accepted it" on the 90th day after instrument of acceptance is received by the Depositary from at least three fourths of the Parties to the Protocol.
Article 20:
Annexes, or amendments to the Annexes of the Protocol, "other than Annex A or B" (list of gases and list of Annex I Parties) enter into force six months after adoption except for those Parties that have "notified the Depositary in writing within that period of their non-acceptance."
Article 21:
Each Party shall have one vote. Regional economic integration organizations may vote as a bloc unless a single member wishes to vote separately, in which case all members must vote separately.
Article 22:
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol.
Article 23:
The Protocol "shall be open for signature at United Nations headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999," and shall be open for accession from the day after the period closes.
Article 24:
The Protocol shall enter into force on the 90th day after 55 Parties to the Convention, "incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I," have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 25:
"No reservations may be made to this Protocol."
(Note: This provision has been included in all treaties since 1992. The Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty was ratified by the Senate only after extensive "reservations" were included in the ratification legislation. Since the Treaty itself precludes reservations, the language of the Treaty would likely prevail in the event of dispute. However, the Untied Nations has not had enforcement capability in the past. The expanding "sanction" power of the World Trade Organization, and the creation of a new International Criminal Court, as well as the enforcement mechanism being developed under this Protocol, will put teeth into the "no reservation" clause in the near future.)
Article 26:
Any Party may withdraw from this Protocol after three years by giving written notification to the Depositary. Withdrawal takes effect one year from date of receipt of notification. Withdrawal from the Convention constitutes automatic withdrawal from the Protocol.
Article 27:
This Protocol shall be considered equally authentic when the text is deposited in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, with the Depositary.
Done at Kyoto this tenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven.