Disagreements Stall Global Warming Talks

By Henry Lamb

BONN, GERMANY - The Kyoto Protocol, launched amid champagne and celebration in 1997, may have struck an iceberg before it ever left port. Cracks in the hull of the global warming agreement that first appeared in Buenos Aires in 1998, appear to be widening here in Bonn, as the delegates begin their second week of negotiations.

BOMB SCARE SCUTTLES CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS IN BONN

By Floy Lilley, J.D.
BONN, GERMANY - Alarms rang. Intercom announcements trumpeted "This is an alert from Security. All people must evacuate the entire building." With that, every person at the Maritim Hotel Bonn was gently but sternly told to move NOW to the outside. In fact, we were herded several blocks away from the front for safety. From delegates to dishwashers, we clumped up in Thursday's, 3 June, '99, afternoon sun.
An orange arm-banded security trooper told me that a bomb threat had come in to the Maritim about four o'clock. The threat promised detonation by five. Bomb squad vehicles raced out from the city and swirled around the hotel.
Hard on their squeals were all available taxis to spirit away those who had already guessed that this process was going to take a while. Within the first hour water and cola was offered to the warm milling group of several hundred. Within the next hour there was talk of Red Cross tents being set up for those of us who had hotel accommodations. We would get a first hand taste of refugee experience.
A thundercloud promising rain caused officials to open an education building for our shelter. The toilets were appreciated. Some located a beer garden. The hotel was pronounced clean and safe by seven o'clock.
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence, but on Friday an invitation was extended to all of us that we be guests of the German delegation on Monday night at the restaurant of the German Parliament. And, perhaps it is just a coincidence, but a noticeable "de-fusing" of tensions prevailed after our bomb scare. Better to have the ice break than the windows.
Floy Lilley is Vice Chair of Sovereignty International , and Program Manager of the Murchison Chair of Free Enterprise, University of Texas at Austin

The issues on which differences appear to be widening, range from budgets to emissions trading schemes, and reach as deep as a definition of what a forest might be.

A key feature of the Protocol is the transfer of technology from developed countries to developing countries. The U.S., Canada, and Australia argue forcefully for a market-based approach through the so-called Clean Development Mechanism(CDM). China and the G-77 nations (group of 77 developing nations) say that "technology transfer [can] not be undertaken under the market process," and that transfer should not be made on commercial terms.

In Kyoto, the delegates agreed that the Protocol would be legally binding on developed nations, but failed to agree on what "legally binding" means. There is no agreement in Bonn. Japan wants "predictable consequences" for non compliance. Canada prefers a series of "procedural steps leading to compliance." The U.S. wants to differentiate between binding, and non-binding articles in the Protocol, but Iran and China insist that the entire Protocol is binding. The Climate Action Network (a coalition of environmental organizations) is campaigning for an "independent" group of experts to enforce compliance, funded by fines levied against offenders. New Zealand argues that a group of experts does not have the authority or capacity to enforce the Protocol, and that this function should be performed by a special group of delegates. This issue is one of several that threaten to sink the Protocol.

A growing controversy is arising from the elusive definition of "land use change and forestry." The U.S. has proposed that crop land and grassland be included in the definition. The special contact group, assigned that task of reaching consensus, decided only to postpone discussion until a flow-chart could be developed. At the second meeting, three flow-charts appeared, and the allotted two hours was spent debating the flow-charts, with no progress toward a definition of what is to be considered a forest.

The budget has also sprung a leak. Expenditures are outstripping receipts, and the delegates are revisiting their enthusiasm for bureaucracy-building. In Kyoto, Executive Secretary, Michael Zammit Cutajar, was instructed to "gear up" to implement the Protocol. He did. The delegates were presented with a proposed 50% budget increase and a 59% increase in staff. The delegates demanded that a new budget be prepared with an increase in the range of five to seven percent.

Even deeper divisions surround the issues of emissions trading and eventual ratification. The Clinton administration has based its economic impact analysis on its vision of what an emissions trading scheme might be. The scheme does not exist, and given the level of disagreement among the delegates, it may never exist. The U.S. wants a market-based program which would result in emissions reduction credits for projects constructed in developing countries by private industry. Strong opposition has been raised by the European Union, China, and others, who say America would be able to achieve too much of its reduction requirement outside its borders, and not have to suffer from energy reductions at home. They insist that emissions reduction credits be earned primarily by curtailing domestic energy use.

With the administration's vision of an emissions trading scheme in place, their estimate of cost to the American economy is $15 to $23 per ton of emissions, which means an annual cost of only about $300 per year per family. Without the scheme in place, independent economists estimate the costs to be as much as ten times higher than the administration's estimates, in the range of $300 per ton of emissions, or $3000 per year per family.

All of this dissension may be moot, anyway. There is growing acceptance of the notion that the Protocol will never go into force. It cannot go into force without the ratification of the United States. The U.S. Senate has unanimously adopted a Resolution that says the Protocol will not be ratified until it is amended. And it cannot be amended until it goes into force.

There are reasons, however, why the delegates continue to plunge forward, reaching agreement where they can, postponing discussion when they must, and avoiding the more controversial issues whenever possible. Scrapping the agreement and starting over again would not only be an admission of failure, and an enormous waste of money, but it would be nearly impossible to rekindle the enthusiasm for a legally binding treaty that existed when the Protocol negotiations began seven years ago.

Unfolding science has continually challenged the basic assumptions which originally motivated the negotiations. The deep divisions revealed by these negotiations will not disappear with a new start. The global warming infrastructure is now a multi-billion dollar enterprise that would be threatened, should the Protocol be abandoned. Despite the arguments in favor of abandoning the project, it is not likely to happen. A "negotiated" outcome acceptable to the major players is much more likely. Side agreements that do not require ratification may provide a way for the negotiators to continue their careers whether or not the Protocol is ever ratified.

While the Protocol, as it was first presented, may be faltering on the sea of international diplomacy, there are indications that life boats are being prepared to save face, bureaucracies, and selected bureaucrats. Whether or not human activity may or may not cause global warming is a question that no longer seems to be on the agenda.

Henry Lamb is the Executive Vice President of the Environmental Conservation Organization (ECO) and Chair of Sovereignty International